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ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DID NOT ERR IN RULING BARBARA
KRAMBULE'S CONTRACTUAL CLAIM
FOR CHILD SUPPORT IS BARRED
BY RES JUDICATA

The Utah Court of Appeals correctly concluded that because
all facts relating to Barbara Krambule's contractual claim for her
son Mathew's support were in existence and known to the parties
prior to the entry of the divorce decree, there has been no
substantial changed circumstances warranting modification.

Hence,

Barbara Krambule is barred by principles of res judicata from now
asserting her contractual claim under the artificial insemination
agreement for Mathew's support which could have and should have
been litigated in the original divorce proceeding.
a) Rick Krambule is not the Biological Father of Mathew.
The trial court made a specific Finding of Fact that Rick
Krambule is

not the

biological

father of

Mathew

Krambule.

(Findings of Fact No. 3 on Motion for Summary Judgment).
Krambule

admitted

that

she

was
1

artificially

Barbara

inseminated

at the University of Utah on June 23, 1991, the date of Mathew's
conception.

(R at 247). Barbara admitted she was inseminated

with a sperm donor other than Rick Krambule as Rick was sterile.
(Barbara Krambule's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment dated October 31, 1997, R at 247). Barbara
acknowledged testimony from third parties proving beyond a
reasonable doubt Rick was not the biological father of Mathew.
(1/21/98 Tr. at 2,3).
b)

Barbara Krambule's Contractual Claim for Support
of Mathew is Barred by Principles of Res Judicata

Barbara Krambule is now precluded from asserting contractual
rights under the artificial insemination agreement as the same is
barred by principles of res judicata. Res judicata has two
branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah App. 1989).

Masters v.

At issue in this

case is the claim preclusion branch of res judicata.

Claim

preclusion prevents relitigation of claims that have been fully
litigated between the same parties, and also precludes claims
which could have and should have been litigated in the prior
action, but were not raised.

See 777 P.2d at 503.

Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only if the suit in
which that cause of action is being asserted and the prior suit
2

satisfy three requirements.

First, both cases must involve the

same parties or their privies.

Second, the claim that is alleged

to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must be
one that could have and should have been raised in the first
action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final
judgment on the merits.

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247

(Utah 1988) .
In this case, Barbara and Rick Krambule are obviously the
same parties in both suits, the contractual claim for the support
of Mathew could have and should have been raised in the first
suit, and the first suit resulted in a final judgment and decree
of divorce on the merits.
Barbara Krambule could have and should have presented her
contractual claim for support pursuant to the artificial
insemination contract in the first suit as she had full and
complete knowledge of all facts supporting the claim for support
at that time.

Barbara knew the following facts at the time of the

first lawsuit:
1.

Barbara and Rick Krambule entered into a contract

entitled "Consent to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy
through Artificial Insemination of Donor Sperm" on July 18, 19 90.
(Findings of Fact No. 5 of Findings of Fact on Motion for Summary
3

Judgment).
2.

Barbara and Rick Krambule separated on May 3, 1991

when Rick moved out of the parties' home.
Deposition pg.ll).

(Barbara Krambule's

Barbara did not advise Rick she was continuing

with artificial insemination procedures after they separated.
(Barbara Krambule's Deposition pg. 18-19).
3. Barbara Krambule conceived Mathew on June 23, 1991
by means of artificial insemination at the University of Utah.
(Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg. 17-18).

Barbara knew she had

conceived Mathew in July, 1991. (Barbara Krambule's Deposition pg.
18) .
4. Rick Krambule filed for divorce in August, 1991.
(Complaint).
5.

Barbara filed an Answer and Counterclaim for

divorce on September 3, 1991 but did not allege she was pregnant
nor did she ever amend her pleadings to so allege.

(Answer and

Counterclaim).
6. Barbara's attorney wrote a letter dated December 3,
1991 that Barbara debated at great lengths whether she should
pursue the support of the child she was expecting and had decided
to pursue it.

The letter explains she is between four (4) and six

(6) months pregnant and had conceived by means of artificial
-4-

insemination.
7.

(Barbara Krambule's Deposition Exhibit 2 ) .
Mathew Krambule was born during the course of the

marriage, date of birth March 24, 1992 and was conceived by
artificial insemination.

(Finding of Fact No. 2, Findings of Fact

to Modified Decree of Divorce).
8.

The parties' Decree of Divorce was signed and

entered by the Court on the 3rd day of April, 1992, after Mathew's
birth.

(Finding No. 2, Findings of Fact to Modified Decree of

Divorce).
9.

Barbara's attorney signed the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce approved as to form.
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce).
10.

The trial court found Barbara's decision to make

no claim for Mathew was carefully considered and during the period
she had assistance of counsel.

(Finding 9e., Findings of Fact to

Modified Decree of Divorce).
11.

Barbara testified she changed her position in

regard to making Mathew an issue at the time of the divorce as she
just wanted to sign the divorce papers.
12.

Barbara thought the best thing for all of us for

now is just to get divorced.
13.

(4/30/98 at 96-97).

(4/30/98 Tr. at 97).

In the divorce, Barbara received from Rick for her
-5-

failure to assert a claim for support for Mathew alimony of
$274.00 per month and all reasonable expenses for books and
tuition for four (4) years to attend Weber State University; and
Rick proceeded to live his life without consideration as to any
financial obligations for Mathew.

(Finding #10, Findings of Fact

to Modified Decree of Divorce).
Barbara filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce in
July, 1996 seeking support for Mathew approximately four (4) years
and three (3) months after the Decree of Divorce was entered.
Sound policy, principles of judicial economy, fairness to the
parties, and finality to legal controversies mandate that Barbara
Krambule's claim be barred by principles of res judicata.
Barbara knowingly agreed to a Judgment and Decree of Divorce
which did not provide for support of Mathew.

Barbara does not

claim she filed a motion for relief from the judgment or to set
aside the Decree of Divorce under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, alleging mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or execusable
neglect, fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct.

Nor did

she file an independent action for fraud after the decree was
entered.

Her actions speak of one who at the time of the divorce

intentionally did not assert any contractual rights under the
artificial insemination contract.
-6-

Her testimony makes it clear

she intentionally did not seek support for Mathew in the initial
lawsuit.
Barbara owed Rick a duty of good faith and fair dealing under
the artificial insemination contract and should have advised him
of her continued participation with artificial insemination
procedures.

Barbara knew she had not advised Rick of her decision

to continue with artificial insemination after they separated and
that Rick was unaware of what she was doing.

Rick had not

knowingly and voluntarily participated in the artificial
insemination procedures after the parties separated on May 3,
1991.

(See paragraph 2 and 8 of the Artificial Insemination

Agreement).
To consent to the artificial insemination procedure at the
University of Utah, Rick and Barbara entered into an agreement,
which provided in part:
2.

We hereby affirm our desire to achieve pregnancy

and request that artificial insemination procedures be utilized in
an attempt to achieve pregnancy in the wife with semen obtained
from an unidentified and undisclosed third party donor(s).

8.

We acknowledge that our participation in the

artificial insemination procedure(s) is voluntary.
Barbara owed Rick a duty of good faith and fair dealing and
-7-

should have advised Rick of her continued participation with
artificial insemination procedures.

Rick's participation must be

voluntary and knowing and he must have an ongoing desire to
achieve pregnancy as evidenced by his continued participation in
the artificial insemination procedure(s).

Barbara, breached her

duty of good faith and fair dealing to Rick in the artificial
insemination contract and having intentionally failed to assert
her contractual rights under the agreement at the time of the
divorce is now barred by the principles of res judicata.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR
IN HOLDING THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE
DECREE OF DIVORCE
The Court of Appeals concluded there was no indication of
any circumstances occurring after entry of the Decree of Divorce
supporting a determination there had been a material substantial
change of circumstances.

Barbara's claim for child support for

Mathew based on the insemination agreement could have and should
have been asserted in the original divorce action and is therefore
now barred under the principles of res judicata.

Consequently,

the Court of Appeals had no option but to conclude that the trial
court erred in determining there was a substantial change of
-8-

circumstances and thus in modifying the Divorce Decree to impose a
child support obligation with respect to Mathew.
a) No Substantial Chancre of Circumstances Occurred after the
Decree.

Barbara must show that the alleged "substantial change in

circumstances has occurred since the entry of the Decree".

See

Bavles vs. Bayles, 981 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah App. 1999) .
In this case, the parties' Decree of Divorce was signed and
entered by the Court on the 3rd day of April, 1992 (Decree of
Divorce).

Before the Decree of Divorce was entered, the parties

entered into a contract entitled "Consent to Perform Procedures to
Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial Insemination of Donor Sperm
on July 18, 1990.

Barbara conceived Mathew on or about June 23,

1991 by

artificial insemination. Barbara Krambule knew

means of

she had conceived Mathew in July, 1991.
divorce

in August, 1991.

Rick Krambule filed for

Barbara through

her

attorney

filed an Answer and Counterclaim for divorce but did not raise the
issue of Mathew in her Counterclaim.

Barbara's attorney wrote a

letter dated December 3, 1991 acknowledging Barbara was expecting
Mathew and had decided to pursue support of the child.

Barbara

and her attorney signed a Stipulation which provided for alimony,
payment of her college tuition and books, and child support for
Stephanie Krambule but did not provide for support of Mathew.
-9-

Mathew was born on March 24, 1992 before the divorce became final.
The parties' Decree of Divorce was signed and entered on the 3rd
day of April, 1992.

Barbara's attorney signed the Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce approved as to
form.

In short, Barbara had full knowledge of all facts to

support her claim under the artificial insemination agreement to
allege Rick was responsible to support Mathew.
b) The Trial Court made no Findings to Support its
Determination of Substantial Change of Circumstances since the
Decree.

The trial court in Conclusions of Law No. 1 determined

there had been a substantial change of circumstance since the
entry of the Decree of Divorce (Conclusions of Law to Modified
Decree of Divorce).

However, the Court made no Findings of Fact

to support or explain its reasoning for determining there had been
a substantial change of circumstance since the entry of the
decree.

Failure of the trial court to make findings on all

material issues is a reversible error unless the facts and records
are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a
finding in favor of the judgment.

See Butler Crockett vs.

Pinecrest Pipeline, 909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995).

The Findings

of Fact must show the Court's Judgment or Decree follows logically
from and is supported by the evidence.
-10-

The findings should be

sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached.

See 909 P.2d at 231.

The Court of Appeals held there was no indication of any
circumstances occurring after entry of the Decree to support a
determination there had been a material substantial change of
circumstance.

To the contrary, all facts were known to Barbara at

the time of the Decree of Divorce to allege a contractual claim
for support of Mathew under the artificial insemination contract.
If Barbara intended to make support of Mathew an issue under the
artificial insemination contract, she should have and could have
made a claim at the time of the first lawsuit; i.e., divorce
decree.
Barbara misperceives the ruling of the Court of Appeals and
argues that court misapplied the standard of review in this case.
The trial court made a conclusion of law "there has been a
substantial change of circumstance since the entry of the Decree
of Divorce" (Conclusions of Law #1 to Modified Decree of Divorce).
However, the trial court made no factual findings underlying or
substantiating that conclusion.

The Court of Appeals ruled

Barbara's claim for child support for Mathew based upon the
artificial insemination agreement could have and should have been
-11-

asserted in the original divorce action and is therefore now
barred under the principles of res judicata.

There is no

indication of any circumstances occurring after entry of the
decree supporting a determination that there had been a
substantial change of circumstances.

Consequently, the trial

court erred in determining there was a substantial change in
circumstances and imposing a child support obligation on Rick with
respect to Mathew.

Ill
ARGUMENTS THAT PUBLIC POLICY FOR
THE SUPPORT OF A CHILD PRECLUDES
BARBARA KRAMBULE FROM DEFEATING
THE CHILD'S RIGHT OF SUPPORT I S
NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF
THIS CASE

I t i s a r g u e d by B a r b a r a Krambule t h a t s t r o n g p u b l i c

policy

e x p r e s s i o n s of c o n c e r n f o r t h e s u p p o r t of a c h i l d h a s l o n g b e e n a
p a r t of U t a h l a w ; i . e . ,
child.

t h a t c h i l d s u p p o r t i s t h e r i g h t of

the

However, t h e r e i s a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n s u p p o r t of a c h i l d

by an a c k n o w l e d g e d f a t h e r and d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p a t e r n i t y
t o an a r t i f i c i a l

insemination

pursuant

contract.

B a r b a r a Krambule c i t e s G u l l e y v s . G u l l e y ,
-12-

570 P . 2 d 127

(Utah

1977) for holding every parent has the inalienable duty to support
their children and cannot rid themselves of it.

However, Gulley

is not on point in this case because the issue is whether Rick
Krambule is a parent of Mathew.

The trial court determined that

Rick Krambule is not the biological father of Mathew.
Krambule could

have and

should

Barbara

have litigated the issue of

support under the artificial insemination contract at the time of
the divorce but chose instead to receive alimony and a college
education.
Barbara Krambule also cites the case of Department of Human
Services vs. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676 (Utah 1997); Huck vs. Huck,
734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986) and Baaas vs. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141
(Utah 1974) in support of her position.

These cases were not

concerned with determination of parentage but instead with issues
of reimbursement of child support from an acknowledged father.
Rick Krambule has not acknowledged he is the father of Mathew and
adamantly refutes that contention.

The cases cited by Barbara

only have application once paternity has been legally established.
See Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 680.

Until paternity is established

there is no duty of support.
Inasmuch as Rick Krambule is not the biological father of
Mathew, Barbara had an obligation to go forward at the time of the
-13-

initial lawsuit to pursue support under the artificial insemination contract as she was aware of all the facts to support her
claim and Mathew was born prior to the parties' divorce becoming
final.

CONCLUSION
Barbara Krambule's claim for child support for Mathew based
on the artificial insemination agreement could have and should
have been litigated in the original divorce case and is therefore
barred under the principles of res judicata.

There is no

indication of any changed circumstances after entry of the Decree
of Divorce supporting a determination there has been a material
substantial change of circumstances.

All of the elements of the

claim preclusion branch of res judicata have been met barring
Barbara's second lawsuit.

Barbara Krambule's claim against Rick

Krambule is a contractual claim and arguments that public policy
for the support of children preclude any act of Barbara Krambule
to defeat the child's right of support is not applicable in the
context of this case.

The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals

in this case is consistent with Utah state law as previously ruled
upon and presents no important or unusual questions of law which

-14-

should be decided by the Utah Supreme Court.
DATED this

/

day of March, 2000.

ROBERT L. NEELEY
/
Attorney for Respondent,
Ricky D. Krambule
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Response to Petition for Certiorari to
Jay D. Edmonds, Attorney for Barbara Krambule, 1660 Orchard Dr.,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106; and two (2) true and correct copies
also to Paige Williamson, Attorney for Barbara Krambule, 10
Exchange Place, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this _5
day of March, 2000, postage prepaid.

ROBERT L. NEELEY
Attorney for Respondent,
Ricky D. Krambule

-15-

/i

